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PrevailingParty In Fee Case May
Receive Compensation For Expert
Witnesses Only At StandardDaily
Witness Fees

Five-Year Statute of Limitations
Applies to Federal Clean Water
Act Suits

A court has no power to order the
payment of expert witness fees in excess
of the standard $30 per day witness fee.
Two cases were consolidated for hearing before the Court. One involved a
defendant sued unsuccessfully under the
antitrust laws who was awarded expert
witness fees in excess of the $30 per day
limit for witnesses found in 28 U.S.C.
section 1821, under the authority of Rule
54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The second involved an award
to a defendant sued unsuccessfully under
42 U.S.C. section 1981, who was awarded
only $30 per day for its expert witnesses.
The Fifth Circuit, en banc, reversed in
the first case and reversed in the second.
Witness fees taxable under 28 U.S.C.
section 1920(3) are limited by 28 U.S.C.
section 1821(b) to $30 per day. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) expresses
the presumption that the prevailing party
in an action is to be awarded costs. The
Court unanimously held that the rule
does not provide independent authority
to award expert witness fees in excess
of the statute. The Court grounded its
reasoning in part on the limitations on
fee shifting contained in the landmark
decision disavowing any general equitable power to shift attorneys' fees,
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).

Justice Blackmun concurred to make
clear his understanding that the decision
did not reach the question whether expert witness fees in excess of $30 per
day could be awarded under 42 U.S.C.
section 1988, which was enacted in response to Alyeska to permit attorneys'
fee awards in civil rights cases. Justices
Marshall and Brennan dissented.
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LITIGATION

The Ninth Circuit held that the federal five-year statute of limitations, not
the state's three-year statute, applies to
federal Clean Water Act suits.
Sierra Club brought a citizens' enforcement action against Chevron for
violating its National Pollution Discharge and Elimination System permit
at its El Segundo refinery under 33
U.S.C. section 1365. Such actions are
permitted where sixty-day notice is given
to the violator and to the state or the
EPA (whichever is the enforcement
agency), and the agency is not diligently
prosecuting an action in court against
the violator. In California, the state is
the enforcement agency pursuant to the
Porter-Cologne Water Quality Act,
Water Code section 13370 et seq.
The action was filed in 1985 in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging violations
dating back to 1977. The Clean Water
Act contains no statute of limitations.
Chevron sought partial summary judgment dismissing all claims predating
1982, on grounds that the state PorterCologne Act provides for a three-year
statute of limitations. The motion was
granted by the trial court.
The Ninth Circuit, per Judges Pregerson, Browning and Reinhardt, reversed.
The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations was found not in the
state statute, but in the federal statute,
28 U.S.C. section 2462. Although the
general rule is to apply the most analogous state statute in the absence of a
limitation in the operative federal law,
that rule is inapplicable where there is a
relevant federal statute. Here, the federal
statute supplies a limitation for actions
for civil penalties by the EPA. Since the
citizens in this suit stand in the shoes of
the EPA, they enjoy the same statute of
limitations, which is five years rather
than the three-year state statute. The
court also held that the statute of limitations is tolled during the sixty-day notice
period precedent to filing suit.
The court also affirmed the district
court's ruling that an existing agency
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enforcement action did not operate as a
bar to the citizens' suit. The Ninth Circuit has therefore joined the Second Circuit, and rejected the Third Circuit's
analysis, and will only bar a citizens'
suit under the Clean Water Act where
the enforcement is proceeding in a court,
as opposed to an administrative forum.
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
King v. Meese,
-Cal.3d_, No. L.A. 32133, 87 Daily
Journal D.A.R. 8013 (October 26, 1987).
FinancialResponsibility Act
Constitutional

The California Supreme Court recently ruled that the 1984 RobbinsMcAlister Financial Responsibility Act,
which provides that failure to present
proof of automobile insurance upon the
request of a peace officer when a notice
to appear is issued for any alleged moving violation is an infraction. The court
examined the statute in light of relevant
provisions of the Insurance Code; in
particular, the court focused upon statutes creating the California Automobile
Assigned Risk Plan (CAARP), Insurance
Code section 11620 et seq., which requires insurers to provide minimum auto
insurance coverage at rates set by the
Insurance Commissioner to drivers who
are "unable to procure [insurance]
through ordinary means."
Plaintiffs were seven individuals who
lived in south central Los Angeles, none
of whom had been involved in an accident or had a traffic violation within the
last three years (or since they started
driving); all of whom had difficulty finding insurers willing to issue them a policy; and none of whom had found private
insurance at premiums below those
offered by CAARP.
According to the court, plaintiffs
challenged the 1984 statute on two
theories. Plaintiffs first contended that
by providing no mechanism whereby a
driver can question and challenge an
insurer's decision not to issue a policy
or the rate thereof, and by effectively
making the ability to drive contingent
on having insurance, the state is denying
drivers procedural due process.
In considering this claim, the court
rejected the reasoning of the Michigan
Supreme Court in Shavers v. Kelly, 267
N.W.2d 72 (1978), which held that insurers were instruments of the state in
carring out Michigan's no-fault insurance
statute, and therefore acts by the insurers

IS
were acts of the state. The California
Supreme Court found that even though
auto insurance is effectively required by
the financial responsibility statute, and
even though insurance is thus a product
or service "the use of which is obligatory
to the enjoyment of a state-protected
property right" (that is, the rights and
privileges stemming from possession of
a driver's license), an insurer's decision
not to write a policy is not state action.
The only "state action" at issue is the
state's decision whether to impose a fine
or suspend a license for failure to prove
financial responsibility; and to that extent, the court examined the CAARP
program to determine whether plaintiffs
were afforded an opportunity to secure
auto insurance through a process which
is neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Because CAARP "effectively guarantees that insurance is offered and available to all eligible drivers," and because
CAARP's rates are set by the Insurance
Commissioner after public hearings, the
court determined that the program is
procedurally sound on its face, and shifted the burden to plaintiffs to establish a
constitutional infirmity. The court then
examined and rejected five arguments
proffered by plaintiffs in an attempt to
meet that burden, and concluded that
"CAARP provides the required access
to insurance in a manner that comports
with procedural due process."
Plaintiff's second theory rested on
the argument that the state's current
insurance regulatory scheme "constitutes
an improper delegation of legislative
authority to the private insurance industry, which determines who can purchase
insurance (and thus who must resort to
CAARP) and what rates they must pay."
The Supreme Court rejected this theory
on grounds that improper delegations of
authority are found only where statutes
grant private groups the power to initiate
or enact rules which have the force of
law. "A statute that merely permits a
private seller to decide to whom to sell,
and at what price, is not unconstitutional."
The court thus vacated its December
5, 1985 order enjoining enforcement of
the 1984 Act, and remanded the matter
to the trial court for further proceedings.
Four justices (Lucas, Arguelles, Kaufman, and Feinerman) joined in Justice
Panelli's majority opinion.
Justice Broussard authored a concurring opinion, to which Justice Mosk
agreed. Justice Broussard criticized the
current state of auto insurance regulation in California ("good driver rates in
Los Angeles often exceed rates charged

LITIGATION
drivers with bad records in other areas");
the Insurance Commissioner's practices
("[lt]he Commissioner has issued no regulations, and published no decisions,
stating explicitly how he or she determines whether a rate is reasonable and
nondiscriminatory'); and plaintiffs (for
failure to seek an administrative remedy,
failure to name as defendants the Commissioner and private insurance companies, and failure to directly attack
CAARP). Justice Broussard described
the serious legal, social, and public
policy issues raised in the lawsuit, but
reluctantly concluded that the case "is
not a suitable one for resolving those
issues."
Maria P. v. Riles,

-Cal.3d._, No L.A. 32086, 87 C.D.O.S.
4581 (Oct. 29, 1987).
Dismissal Under Five- Year
Nonprosecution Statute Does Not
PrecludeAward of Attorneys'Fees

ed the trial court of jurisdiction to award
fees.
Per Justice Broussard and a unanimous court, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a fee award is ancillary to
the action, and generally requires a final
disposition before a motion for fees may
be entertained. Therefore, the dismissal
did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. In any case, a section 583(b)
dismissal is not a final judgment and
does not divest the court of jurisdiction.
Because the determination in awarding
attorneys' fees is the causal connection
between the result or relief obtained and
the impact of the action, and not technical matters such as the procedural
devices employed to obtain the result or
the eventual disposition of the lawsuit,
an award was appropriate for work leading to the issuance of the preliminary
injunction. The Court also awarded fees
for defending the fee award on appeal.

The California Supreme Court held
that although a suit had been dismissed
under the five-year failure to prosecute
statute, plaintiffs who had received a
preliminary injunction were still prevailing parties entitled to an award of attorneys' fees.
Plaintiffs filed suit in 1975 to, inter
alia, prevent school authorities from
reporting children's immigration status
to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, as required by then-operative
Education Code section 6957. They
successfully sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute
by the local or state school officials. The
state school officials subsequently issued
directives to all local school officials to
comply with the court order and disregard the statute. The legislature in
1977 first amended the statute and then
repealed it. No further action was taken
in the court case.
After passage of the requisite time
period, defendants successfully moved
to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute it within five years, under Code of
Civil Procedure section 583(b). Following the dismissal order, plaintiffs moved
for an award of attorneys' fees under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
The trial court awarded fees up to the
granting of the preliminary injunction,
but denied fees thereafter, holding that
the amendment and repeal of the statute
had mooted the issue without a specific
result attributable to the court case. The
court of appeal reversed and disallowed
all fees, holding that the dismissal divest-
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